COINTELPRO

Psychological Warfare and Magnum Justice

⁶⁶ Manipulating police and rival political factions like markers on a monopoly gameboard, the FBI "neutralized" the Black Panther Party in the most brutal sense of the word. ⁹⁹



.? Tim Butz

For 15 years the Federal Bureau of Investigation managed a coordinated program of infiltration, disruption, and black propaganda that was mandated and controlled by the highest officials of the Bureau. Known as the Counterintelligence Program, or COINTELPRO in FBI Newspeak, these operations combined the most vicious aspects of psychological warfare and officially sanctioned vigilante terrorism against dissidents and non-whites who challenged the policies of the American government.

In its wake, the COINTELPRO actions of the FBI shattered many lives. Jobs were lost, homes broken up, reputations ruined, organizations crippled and decimated, and people were killed. For Bunchy Carter, John Huggins, Mark Clark and Fred Hampton, COINTELPRO was more than a psychological warfare operation against them and the Black Panther Party; it was a death warrant to have them killed without making the direct connection to the Bureau itself.

Seven general areas of counterintelligence operations have been described publicly by the FBI, but evidence produced in court trials and Congressional investigations indicate that other areas also existed. Although the FBI is quick to claim to the press that the COINTELPRO was abolished in 1971, they are just as quick to admit quietly to their friends that they have abandoned only a consolidated program and not the *tactics* of counterintelligence.

COINTELPRO as an exercise in psychological warfare can



best be understood by comparing its stated purpose with the military, Psy-War purpose. According to internal FBI memoranda, the Counterintelligence Program was designed to "expose, disrupt, and neutralize" targeted groups through the use of rumors, lies, half truths and government "front" organizations. COINTELPRO could be termed a "dis-information" program.

Psychological warfare is similarly defined by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the official DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms: psychological warfare is the "planned use of propaganda and other measures designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitude, and behavior of enemy, neutral, or friendly groups in support of current policy and aims." A look at the major components of COINTELPRO show that it is compatable with this definition of psychological warfare.

The use of rumors, lies, and half truths is commonly called "black propaganda operations," and is a well established custom within the intelligence community. The FBI used black propaganda, which was a national choice of tactics given the goal of COINTELPRO to neutralize the opposition by manufacturing or exploiting weaknesses. The U.S. Army teaches students at the Army Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg that "... vulnerabilities can best be exploited by means of black propaganda... and (it) requires great care and secrecy..." Great care and secrecy were the watch words of COINTEL-PRO. Had it not been for the burglary of the FBI Resident Agency office in Media, Pa., on March 8, 1971, the existence of COINTELPRO may have never been uncovered. In that burglary, internal FBI memos were stolen and later released to the press. An analysis of the documents showed that 45 percent of the FBI memos dealt with criminal activities, 1 percent with organized crime, 14 percent with draft and military resistance to the Vietnam War, and 40 percent with other political activities. Among the political activities documents were several relating to the Counterintelligence Program. An order to terminate COINTELPRO came within six weeks of the burglary, shortly after the documents were released to the press.

NBC reporter Carl Stern read the Media Papers and, sensing an important story, he filed a Freedom of Information request for the documents authorizing the program. After a two-year legal battle, the FBI released some of the documents to Stern. Stern's attorney, Ronald Plessar, pursued the matter and finally forced the Bureau to release a second series of documents. From Plessar and Stern's work came the first flood of information on COINTELPRO.

Since the first documents released to Stern and Plessar on December 7, 1973, there have been two major lawsuits focused on COINTELPRO. One suit has been brought by the Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance against the FBI, CIA, and various government officials. The second suit was brought by the survivors of the December 4, 1969 raid on a Black Panther Party apartment and the relatives of two men killed in the raid, Mark Clark and Fred Hampton. The recent House and Senate intelligence investigations revealed a mass of previously unknown facts around the FBI and COINTEL-PRO. From these major sources, it is possible to see how COINTELPRO developed as a psychological warfare activity.

How COINTELPRO Began

The first FBI counterintelligence operation was initiated in 1956 and targeted against the Community Party-USA (CP-USA). According to former Attorney General Saxbe, the effort was justified by a "prevailing view in Congress and the American people that the Federal Government should take appropriate steps against domestic subversion." Perhaps the real reason was J. Edgar Hoover's personal dissatisfaction and frustration with the failure of the government to imprison communists. The Smith Act, designed to destroy the CP-USA and the Socialist Workers Party, had failed in its goals. Of 141 people indicted under the Smith Act, only 29 ever served time in prison. When the Supreme Court ruled in 1957 that advocacy of a doctrine or "evil intent" was still covered by the First Amendment, the Smith Act lost its main thrust. It became clear to Hoover that other steps had to be taken.

It was easy for the FBI to develop information for a CP-USA COINTELPRO: of an estimated 8,500 members, 1,500 of them were FBI informants and provided a wealth of information on Party structure, finances, and the personal lives of the membership. Hoover finally had to order his agents not to recruit any more informants unless they were in "the highest policy making levels" of the Party. On August 28, 1956, the CP-USA began.

One "high level" informant was a Security Officer in the Central Committee of the CP-USA. According to former FBI agent Jack Levine, the Security Officer was responsible for discrediting loyal Party members and granting clearances to others who were actually FBI plants. This tactic was one of many the Justice Department later admitted was a COINTEL-

PRO action.

On October 12, 1961, the FBI turned its sights on the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). According to a memo signed by Hoover, the SWP's sins included their support of "Castro's Cuba", integration, and their sponsoring socialist candidates in local and national elections.

The next target group became those the Bureau termed "White Hate Groups." Seventeen Ku Klux Klan chapters were targeted for COINTELPRO operations under a memorandum that included a subtle note of apology. As if to say that the problem might simply be a few bad apples in the barrel, Hoover wrote: "Often these groups act without the approval of the Klan organization or membership" when conducting attacks on civil rights workers and Blacks.

With the expansion of the civil rights movement and the emergence of nationalism among Blacks, Hoover ordered the FBI to target "Black Nationalist - Hate Groups" for counterintelligence disruption. In an August 25, 1967, memo, Hoover outlined the goals of the newest COINTELPRO: "to expose, disrupt, misdirect, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters ..."

Six months later, on February 29, 1968, Hoover expanded the Bureau's position on the COINTELPRO-Black Nationalist program with a memo that outlined five specific goals:

(1) Prevent coalitions of Black groups:

(2) Prevent the rise of a Black "messiah", such as Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael, and Elijah Mohammud;

(3) Prevent violence;

(4) Prevent Black groups and leaders "from gaining respectability";

(5) Prevent the long-range growth of Black groups, especially in their recruitment of youth.

A few weeks after Hoover's memo, one of his major adversaries was eliminated. Dr. Martin Luther King, the subject of a seven-year Bureau campaign of wiretapping and harrassment, was killed by a sniper in a Memphis hotel. King had changed his hotel after the FBI planted a story in the local press that he was living in a Holiday Inn rather than in a local Black-owned hotel. Deliberate or not, the FBI set Dr. King up for his assassination.

In May, 1968, the FBI began a fifth domestic counterintelligence effort, this time targeted against the predominately white New Left. The goals were the same: the use of propaganda and other disruptive measures to neutralize an FBI enemy.

Each of the Counterintelligence Programs operated along the same basic lines. At each participating field office (not all offices were involved with every program), a counterintelligence coordinator was selected and charged with supervision of the program locally. It was the coordinator's job to identify potential weaknesses within the target grouping and devise the proper technique to create the desired disruption or neutralization.

Recommendations for counterintelligence actions were then prepared with descriptions of the target group, the action to be taken, and desired results. This letter was then sent to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., where they were either approved or rejected. The official primarily responsible for COINTELPRO was William Sullivan, who in 1961 became the Assistant Director in charge of the Intelligence Division, and his deputy, Charles D. Brennan.

The field office coordinators also provided Sullivan and Brennan with quarterly status reports on the progress of COINTELPRO activities in their areas. These reports broke COINTELPRO information into four areas: actions pending, actions in progress, actions completed and their results, and miscellaneous information.

This structure and reporting system provided a simple but efficient bureaucratic mechanism for strict control over the program. Headquarters constantly warned field offices to avoid any form of counterintelligence activity without specific authorization from Washington. Under this system of reports, proposals, and evaluation, 3,247 counterintelligence actions were considered and 2,370 were conducted.

In his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams stated that COINTELPRO actions "were not designed for the purpose of harrassment of an individual... they were designed to disrupt groups." In order to conduct the disruptions, the FBI used the oldest psy-war tactic, the manipulation of information.

Spreading Black Propaganda

The most popular tactic was the manufacturing of false and anonymous information and distributing it in such a way as to create or aggrevate tension. This tactic accounted for a full 40 percent of all FBI COINTELPRO actions. On one occasion, the Bureau decided to disseminate false information to members of the Oakland, Ca., chapter of the Black Panther Party by fabricating an anonymous "leak" within the Oakland or San Francisco Police departments. The purpose of the false leak was to make the Panthers think that the leadership was stealing Party funds, that wiretaps were installed in places where none existed, that loyal members were informants, and other lies designed to promote factionalism.

The tactic of framing Party members as informers was not limited to the Panthers. The FBI used that tactic against both the Communist Party and the New Left.

A variation of this tactic was often used to split Black and White movement groups from cooperating and coalescing. In 1969, the FBI used an informant, in the Black United Front of Washington, D.C., to make false money demands from the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam. In a manufactured letter, the FBI demanded the "Mobe" post a high cash bond to insure that Washington's black community would not be harmed by the demonstration. That action succeeded in creating tension between the Mobilization committee and the Black United Front and diverting energy from building the largest anti-war demonstration of the 1960's.

Such black propaganda was also used to create friction between the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Black Panther Party. Selected informants within the Illinois Chapter of the Panthers were instructed to create a dynamic, through the use of lies, that would stop the Panthers and SDS from working in a political coalition.

Organizations can sometimes be crippled by the use of a Counterintelligence technique against a key individual. In St. Louis, the FBI attempted to stop a white woman who was working with a predominately Black neighborhood group. In order to neutralize her, the Bureau sent an anonymous letter to the woman's husband alleging infidelity and adultery. The letter was written in street language and purported to be from "some Black sisters"; it complained that the woman was sleeping with "their" men.

The second most popular tactic used in COINTELPRO was the dissemination of confidential and semi-public information to friendly sources within the media. As the final report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence points out, the FBI for years had developed a media liaison program that allowed them to use journalists as intelligence sources and as active agents in distributing FBI black propaganda.

The purpose of this type of action was to embarrass (and therefore affect the political power of) key movement activists. The most notorious examples of this were in connection with the Bureau's attempts to discredit and even blackmail Dr. Martin Luther King through the use of tapes made of Dr. King's private life. At one point, Senate investigators found that the FBI had gone so far as to even suggest to Dr. King that he should commit suicide several weeks before he was to travel to Stockholm and receive the Nobel Peace Prize.

Official FBI records show that this blackmail/black propaganda operation was used by the FBI in 20 percent of all COINTELPRO actions.

Information was also provided to local authorities and other Federal agencies in hopes of having people arrested or harrassed. The FBI used this tactic in 1967 to have black leaders in one unidentified town arrested and re-arrested on minor local charges until they could no longer meet bail. The FBI then congratulated itself because there were no riots in the town that summer.

The FBI went to Washington, D.C. building officials on another occasion and requested that they check a local private school run by the Nation of Islam (Black Muslims). The FBI had hoped that the building inspectors would find enough violations of the building code to have the school closed down. While they did not succeed in that goal, they were pleased by an added side benefit; through the housing inspectors they obtained the names and backgrounds of all the parents and students at the school.

In 1968, as the New Mobilization Committee and other antiwar forces were planning to demonstrate at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, the FBI sought to neutralize one of the Mobe's key figures, Dr. Sidney Peck. In Dr. Peck's case, the FBI went to the Internal Revenue Service and asked them to perform an audit on his tax returns. IRS, of course, found nothing out of order, but it did create a major drain on the time that Dr. Peck could devote to his work on behalf of the Mobe.

Members of the Socialist Workers Party often found that this tactic was used against them, particularly Party members who happened to work as teachers. Dr. Morris Starsky, an untenured faculty member at Arizona State University, and Maude Wilkerson, a school teacher in Washington, D.C., both lost their jobs as a result of the FBI contacting the state or local educational authorities.

It was the tactic of using local authorities to do the dirty work the FBI was unable to do itself, that led to raids on the homes and offices of the Black Panthers, including the Dec. 4, 1969 raid that resulted in the shootings of Mark Clark and Fred Hampton.

All the information that the FBI could collect from its informants, and all the government and private sector agencies and institutions that they could use were called into action for COINTELPRO. Members of the SWP and CP-USA lost jobs because of their political affiliation, a right guaranteed under the First Amendment. Black activists and New Left leaders were slurred in leaflets and in the media without justification or attribution to the FBI. Families and friendships were split as the FBI sought to manipulate people through the most powerful weapon — information, or more correctly in this case, lies, rumors, and innuendoes. If the FBI judged that a person was of importance to a group on the FBI's laundry list of targets, it would then mount a COINTELPRO action against him or her.

FBI agents even interfered with the judicial and political



FBI: Crooks with Badges

Although not officially listed as counterintelligence activities, the FBI has engaged in criminal actions in the name of national security. In their operations against the Socialist Workers Party, the FBI engaged in 92 burglaries of SWP New York offices in the period of 1960 - 1966, or an average of one burglary every six and a half weeks.

Other criminal actions included mail theft and mail opening and the use of electronic surveillance without court authorization (16 separate bugs and wiretaps against Dr. Martin Luther King alone).

So far, no Bureau official or Special Agent has been indicted for the activities.

process when they so desired. FBI agents visited candidates and red-baited campaign workers who did not conform to the FBI's concept of an acceptable American. Judges and grand jury foremen were shown confidential reports on an "off the record" basis in hopes of affecting their decisions in legal matters. No institution, the press, the electoral process and the legal system were immune from manipulation by the FBI. John Edgar Hoover declared himself the political censor of America, and the counterintelligence program was his vehicle for silencing the thoughts and individuals that he opposed. COINTEL-PRO brings to mind the famous statement by an American infantry officer in Vietnam . . . "We had to destroy the village in order to save it."

The FBI has admitted that its informants were told to deliberately perform acts of disruption, but it denies that such activity is synonymous with the use of agent provocateurs.

Phony Organizations

Another counterintelligence tactic was the use of "notionals", or political organizations manufactured by the FBI to serve as front groups within both right and left wing circles. Attorney General Saxbe claimed that this tactic was used only against Ku Klux Klan type organizations, but public statements and news reports contradict his claim.

At least one Ku Klux Klan "klavern" was established by the Bureau and composed entirely of FBI informants. This klavern was supposed to attract both unorganized and potential KKK adherants as well as members of other Klaverns who were dissatisfied with other Klan groups. It was hoped that the use of notional klaverns would eventually create a situation where large number of United Klans of America members would leave and drain the strength of the group.

It is believed by many Bureau critics that as many as six phony "Mao-ist" groups were set up by the FBI in its COIN-TELPRO-New Left activities. Only two have been definitely identified, and the FBI refuses to comment on the possibility that others were created.

In New Orleans, FBI husband-wife team Jill and Gi Schafer were paid \$10,000 per year for their services, which included the founding of the Red Star Collective. The Schafers used the Red Star Collective as a base for a wide range of activities, including a trip to China for Jill.

Gi Schafer used his credentials to visit Paris and attend a meeting between anti-war activists and representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. He later went to Wounded Knee during the 71 day confrontation between Oglala Sioux and the U.S. government. He was asked to leave because Wounded Knee support people began to suspect him of being an agent. The Red Star Cadre was another notional group established

The Red Star Cadre was another notional group established by the FBI in Tampa, Florida. Informant Joseph Burton was responsible for establishing the group after he had attempted to infiltrate the United Electrical Workers. Using FBI money, Burton opened a junk shop that became a center for Movement activity in the Tampa Bay area.

FBI Provoked Violence

Psychological warfare is generally considered to be a nonviolent activity. Anthropologist Margaret Mead has defined psy-war as one of the "forms of conflict in which the killing of people is not sanctioned." While it is true that the COIN-TELPRO actions were not violent in their own, the results of FBI COINTELPRO actions were sometimes very violent, especially against Blacks.

FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe was a participant in COINTELPRO activities against the Ku Klux Klan. On two separate occasions, he was told by his Bureau supervisors to participate in beatings of civil rights workers in Alabama. The Bureau justified the action by telling Rowe that it was necessary for him to build and maintain his cover within the Klan.

Rowe once informed the FBI seven days in advance that the Klan would attack Blacks at a county fair. The FBI did not intervene to prevent the beatings from occurring. On a second occasion, Rowe gave three weeks notice that "Freedom Riders" arriving in Birmingham would be greeted by local Klan members who had police assurances that they could beat the civil rights workers for 15 minutes before they would be stopped. Again, the FBI did nothing to intervene even though they were aware of potential civil rights violations and that local authorities were a part of the conspiracy.

Rowe's actions were not directly linked to any COINTEL-PRO request, but they are an indirect result of the program. Had Rowe not been participating in COINTELPRO actions, he would not have needed to maintain the deep cover that he did. It is hard to believe that other FBI informants involved with the Klan did not experience similar situations where the FBI told them to improve their credibility at the expense of civil rights workers and Blacks.

Psy-war As Magnum Justice

The FBI was fully cognizant of the potential for violence as a consequence of the counterintelligence program. In the case of the Black Panther Party (BPP), it appears that violence was the desired result of COINTELPRO actions. By provoking confrontations between the Panthers and either the police or other political groups, the Bureau was able to "neutralize" the Panthers without direct complicity — a standard intelligence technique known as the use of a "cut out" (third party) or "maintaining plausible denial."

Even the Senate Select Committee, in their special COIN-TELPRO report, had to admit that such activities "involved risk of serious bodily injury or death to the targets." It is not just risk, it is fact, that members of the Black Panther Party found violence was integral to COINTELPRO actions against them; psy-war took on the characteristic of Magnum Justice towards the Black Panther Party.

Manipulating police and rival political factions like markers on a Monopoly gameboard, the FBI used their psychological warfare techniques to "neutralize" the Black Panthers in the most brutal sense of the word. Documentation presented to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and as evidence in a civil suit over the death of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark show that the Bureau's approach to the Panthers was one of being at war. Even the Senate Select Committee investigators felt that the tone of COINTELPRO memos relating to Blacks and the New Left were worthy of comment. Minority counsel Curtis Smothers told the senators:

"The rhetoric of the Bureau — as these programs advanced from the initial program relating to the Communist Party, USA to the ultimate programs of Black Nationalist and New Left — became tougher and tougher, and what began as effforts to disrupt — the word used for the Communist Party, and in the case of the Klan, some indication that they genuinely were looking after violence and not simply to destroy the groups — became in the case of the Black Nationalist and New Left... the most extreme rhetoric of a plan to destroy political protest groups that you could imagine...."

Provoking violence through psy-war and "cut-outs" can be documented in three separate operations around the Black Panther Party. One was the attempt by the Bureau to intensify the factional differences between the Panthers and the United Slaves (US). The second was the attempts to pit the Blackstone Rangers, a Chicago street gang, against the Panthers; the third case called for an FBI-instigated raid on the Chicago Panther headquarters that led to the assassination of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark.

On November 25, 1968, a Sullivan/Hoover memo was sent to FBI field offices participating in the COINTELPRO-Black Nationalist program. It stated in part:

"For the information of recipient offices a serious struggle is taking place between the Black Panther Party (BPP) and the US organization. The struggle has reached such proportions that it is taking on the aura of gang warfare with attendant threats of murder and reprisals.

"In order to fully capitalize upon BPP and US differences as well as to exploit all avenues of creating further dissention in the ranks of the BPP, recipient offices are instructed to submit hard-hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the BPP" (emphasis added)

To continue sharpening the rift between BPP and US, Sullivan ordered each participating field office to submit biweekly suggestion letters to the Bureau on the Panthers.

Soon, the streets of San Diego and Los Angeles were the site of new leaflets designed to heighten the tension between the two groups. Whether Sullivan welcomed this increase in tension and hoped that some Panther would die, is yet to be proved. What is known is that the Los Angeles Police Department liaison with the FBI, William Hynes, was directing the actions of an undercover informant named Louis Tackwood. Tackwood claimed, in his book, *The Glasshouse Tapes*, that he was acting as a liaison between the police and US, and that the LAPD armed the United Slaves.

At the time of the FBI memos about aggravating tension between the two Black groups, the Black Student Union at UCLA was preparing for the election of a new president. Ron Karanga, head of US, was supporting one of his loyalists. Black Panthers Bunchy Carter and John Huggins were advocating a delay in the election until other candidates could be found. The Carter-Huggins position was gaining within the Union when a meeting was called for January 17, 1969.

At the meeting the US position suffered a setback. As the students began to leave the dining room in Campbell Hall, members of US pulled out guns and shot the two young Panthers.

While it cannot be proved that any law enforcement officer actually ordered the killing, the fact remains that the FBI knew they were fueling a fire when they increased tension between US and the Panthers through their subtle methods of psy-war. The FBI realized part of its goals with the death of Carter and Huggins: Two potential leaders of the Panthers were "neutralized" before they reached *their* goals, and the work of the Panthers was set back by their loss.

As Paul Jacobs pointed out recently in the Los Angeles Times, "morally the FBI must share the responsibility for his (Carter's) death, for the bureau now admits that it fomented dissension and fierce fighting between US and the Black Panthers."

The aggravation of tension between the Panthers and US did not stop when Carter and Huggins were murdered. Eight months and one day after their death, the San Diego Field Office sent a memo to Washington that stated:

"Shootings, beatings, and a high degree of unrest continues to prevail in the ghetto area of southeast San Diego. Although no specific counterintelligence action can be credited with contributing to this overall situation, it is felt that a substantial amount of this unrest is directly attributable to this program."

Anti-Panther Program "Revised"

After San Diego Panther Clifford Bell was shot to death, the San Diego Field Office told Washington that is was considering revising its black propaganda and suggested "a new cartoon (be) considered in the hopes that it will assist in the continuance of the rift between the Panthers and US." Sullivan and Hoover approved the idea. The FBI had derogatory wall posters printed and plastered up around the ghetto.

The same tactic, pitting Black against Black, was attempted by the FBI in Chicago. When Fred Hampton and the Chicago Panthers began to talk with street gangs about common goals



and work, the FBI moved swiftly to prevent one of Hoover's greatest fears, the coalition of militant Black organizations. To keep distance between the two groups, the Chicago Field Office suggested that tensions between the Panthers and the Black-stone Rangers be further aggravated through a bit of black propaganda. On January 30, 1969, Sullivan authorized the Chicago office to send the following anonymous letter to Ranger leader Jeff Fort:

Brother Jeff,

I've spent some time with some Panther friends on the west side lately and I know what's been going on. The brothers that run the Panthers blame you for blocking their thing and their's supposed to be a hit out for you. I'm not a Panther, or a Ranger, just Black. From what I see these Panthers are out for themselves not black people. I think you ought to know what they're up to, I know what I'd do if I was you. You might hear from me again.

A black brother you don't know When Chicago suggested the letter on January 13, 1969, they noted that, for the Rangers, "violent type activity, shooting and the like, are second nature." The Chicago office recommended against using the tactic in reverse (a fake Ranger letter to the Panthers) because the Panthers were not considered to be as violent as the Rangers. The intent of this memo is clear: if the letter went to the Rangers, people may be shot; if it went to the Panthers, the desired results may not have been realized. In any event, the tactic failed to get Fred Hampton killed, so another technique was used to neutralize the Panthers in Chicago.

The FBI managed to place an informant within the Panther organization named William O'Neal. O'Neal worked his way through the organization and was finally assigned the job of bodyguard to Hampton, who was the Illinois State Chairman. O'Neal's activities were monitored and directed by his case officer, FBI Special Agent Roy Mitchell, the COINTELPRO coordinator for the Chicago office.

Between March and December, 1969, police conducted 16 raids against Panther offices and apartments in over ten cities. Three of those raids occurred in Chicago, including the one that led to the deaths of Hampton and Clark. The chronology of events leading to that final raid is complex, but several major events stand out:

June 4, 1969: FBI Special Agent In Charge of the Chicago Field Office, Marlin Johnson, leads a raid on the Chicago Panther Office. Before entering the offices, the FBI announced their intention and meets no resistance. Money and lists of contributors are seized, eight Panthers arrested. All charges are later dropped.

July 16, 1969: Chicago Police and two Panthers are involved in a shoot-out. One Panther is killed, the second arrested. Charges are later dropped.

July 31, 1969: A second police-Panther shoot-out. Five policemen wounded, three Panthers arrested. All charges later dropped.

October 16, 1969: A second raid on the Panther headquarters leads to the arrest of six Panthers for attempted murder. All charges were later dropped.

November 13, 1969: Another shoot-out between the police and the Panthers leaves two policemen and one Panther dead. The dead Panther, Spurgeon Jake Winters, is alleged to have fired the first shot.

On November 21, 1969, the FBI approached the Chicago police and suggested another raid on the Panther headquarters. Informant O'Neal told his case officer that there was a stockpile of weapons in the apartment-headquarters at 2337 West Monroe St.; and although the information indicated that the weapons were all legally obtained, the police planned a raid for November 25th. On November 23rd the raid was cancelled when O'Neal reported that the weapons had been removed because the Panthers had heard of the impending raid.

On December 1, the FBI contacted the Special Prosecutions Office of the Illinois State Attorney and informed them that the weapons had been returned. On December 2, a raid was planned for the evening of the 3rd, to be led by State's Attorney Edward Hanrahan. Sgt. Daniel Groth of the Chicago Police Department was in charge of the 14 officers assigned to the raid.

Groth and Hanrahan decided to raid the house at 8:00 p.m. on December 3. When they learned that the apartment would be empty, they changed their time to 4:45 a.m. on December 4. Had the raid occurred during the Panther absence, the illegal weapons the police claimed were inside the apartment could have been confiscated without confrontation.

In planning for the attack, Groth and Hanrahan armed their men with a Thompson sub-maching gun, an automatic carbine, five shotguns, .38 specials and .357 magnums. No provisions were made for outside lighting, tear-gas, or even prior surveillance of the building.

At the appointed hour, they struck; 98 shots were fired, only one from a Panther weapon. As ballistics would later show, it was impossible for the first shot to have been fired by Mark Clark. During the course of the firing, the bullets fired into Hampton's bed shook the mattress as Deborah Johnson tried to cover Hampton's body. Hampton never had a chance that evening; an independent autopsy later revealed a large quantity of barbiturates in his stomach. Hampton was not a drug user.

Currently, the families of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark and the survivors of the December 4th raid are sueing the Federal, Illinois State, and Chicago authorities in a \$47 million "wrongful death" suit. A massive amount of information has been turned over to the plaintiffs, most of which remains under a court-ordered seal. Some of the information that has come out in court has been very damaging, especially an FBI map of the Panther apartment with Hampton's bed marked with an X.

As with Bunchy Carter and John Huggins, the FBI's COIN-TELPRO must shoulder the blame for the death of Clark and Hampton. The raid was not an accident; the targeting of Hampton was deliberate because he had the potential for being something Hoover greatly feared, a Black "messiah". Hampton was a "danger" because he had begun to forge alliances between the Panthers and poor Appalachian White and Puerto Ricans. Such dangers had to be countered by the Bureau, and COINTELPRO provided the most effective vehicle for doing so. As former Attorney General Saxbe pointed out, the COINtelpro tactic of advising local police of intelligence in hopes of fomenting an arrest was a common and perfectly legal tactic, notwithstanding an effective "neutralization" tactic.

Current Counterintelligence

On April 28, 1971, just six weeks after the Media break-in, J. Edgar Hoover ordered the FBI to terminate COINTEL-

PRO for security reasons. In a carefully worded order to the field offices, Hoover made it clear that the FBI was not abandoning the use of psychological warfare tactics; all that was affected by the order was the reporting and supervision system established by Sullivan. In that order, Hoover instructed his agents that:

"In exceptional instances where it is considered counterintelligence is warranted, recommendations should be submitted to the Bureau under the individual case caption to which it pertains. These recommendations will be considered on an individual basis."

Under these new guidelines, a Special Agent who desired to disrupt the activities of, for example, Women's Strike for Peace would submit his ideas to Sullivan under the regular routing system for all reports on Women's Strike. By changing the reporting system, the FBI was able to state truthfully that the Counterintelligence Programs had been abolished and even produce the appropriate memos to support their claims, and still have the option of using the techniques and tactics when they so desired.

There have yet to be any exposures of continued use of counterintelligence techniques other than a few statements by Joseph Burton, who claims he was involved with COINTEL-PRO type disruptions right up to the time he quit the FBI in 1974.

Los Angeles Times reporter Narda Zaccino reported on Sept. 22, 1975, that an FBI official had admitted to her that counterintelligence activities were continuing, but the official refused to divulge the name applied to counterintelligence activities.

Investigators for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence had slightly more luck than Zaccino. In the course of their work, they were able to identify the title applied to current counterintelligence efforts — *intensive investigations*. If they discovered more than a name, they did not reveal it during the course of public hearings, other than official explanations for the need to continue such work.

The shortcomings of Congressional oversight over the FBI became obvious when FBI Director Clarence Kelley appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee last winter. During his appearance to ask for continued FBI funding, Kelley told the Senators that a large number of Soviet bloc intelligence officers were operating within the United States. Kelley asked the Committee to approve a budget that contained authorization for \$4,350,000 for counterintelligence activities. Under that authorization, the FBI would increase its counterintelligence staff by 250 people.

Kelley did not volunteer any information about "intensive investigations" or any other aspect of domestic counterintelligence. Not one Senator had the courage to confront Kelley on this, or to probe him with questions on how the over \$4.3 million would be spent. The Appropriations Committee kept Mr. Kelley before them for the shortest possible time and said nothing to challenge his statements, just as they did with Hoover when he was Director.

When the first COINTELPRO was established, the threat of domestic communism was used to justify the program. Today, the government is touting a new enemy, a new rationale for repression, just as they used the Red Scare of the 1950's. That new threat, of course, is terrorism.

There are many other questions that the American people must face. We would be a naive people if we really believed that the worst of these abuses of power have concluded. Call it psywar or COINTELPRO, the fact remains that the FBI's war against those labeled political enemies, continues today. Judging from the recent events on the Pine Ridge Reservation, the viciousness that the FBI once displayed against the Panthers has now been re-focused on the American Indian Movement. Who's next after AIM?

See Elaine Brown's commentary on the Senate Committee's reports on COINTELPRO's goal to destroy the Black Panther Party (page 3).

